Neutrosophic Technique and its Application

A. A. Salama
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Faculty of Sciences, Port Said University, 23 December Street, Port Said 522, Egypt.
drsalama44@gmail.com

Abstract

The fundamental concepts of neutrosophic set, introduced by Smarandache in [38, 39, 40], and Salama et al. in [20-37], provides a natural foundation for treating mathematically the neutrosophic phenomena which exist pervasively in our real world and for building new branches of neutrosophic mathematics. Neutrosophy has laid the foundation for a whole family of new mathematical theories generalizing both their classical and fuzzy counterparts. In this paper we, propose a security scheme based on Public Key infrastructure (PKI) for distributing session keys between nodes. The length of those keys is decided using neutrosophic logic manipulation. The proposed algorithm of Security model is an adaptive neutrosophic logic (membership function, non-membership and indeterminacy) based algorithm that can adapt itself according to the dynamic conditions of mobile hosts. Finally the Experimental results shows that the using of neutrosophic based security can enhance the security of (MANETs). The rest of this paper is organized as follows; some backgrounds are given in section 1. Section 2 provides the proposed security mechanism. A comparison of the proposed mechanism with some of the current security mechanisms is provided in section 3. Section 4 provides the conclusions and future work.

Keywords: Neutrosophic Data; MANET; Security; Wireless; Communication; PKI; KNN; Neutrosophic Sets;

1. Introduction

Adhoc is a Latin word that means "for this or that only" AdHoc Networks, as its name indicates, are "intended to be" temporary. The idea is to completely remove any Base Station. Imagine a scenario in a relief operation in the event of timely communication is a very important factor, aid workers in the area are without the need of any existing infrastructure, just turn on the phone and start communicating with each other during movement and the execution of rescue operations [1, 2, 32]. A major challenge in the design of these networks is their vulnerability to security attacks. This article presents an overview of the security and ad hoc networks, and security threats applicable to ad hoc networks. It proposed a wide range of military and commercial applications for MANET. For example, a unit of soldiers that move in the battlefield cannot afford to install a base station every time you go to a new area. Similarly, the creation of a communication infrastructure for a conference meeting informal and spontaneous between a small numbers of people that cannot be economically justified [5]. Even the robot-based networks in which multiple robots work at the same time to make the piles are extremely difficult for humans (the
The discovery of outer space and the extraction of minerals, smart homes and other important applications known to exist in applications vehicles Auto-routing. In addition, MANET can be the perfect tool for disaster recovery or emergency situations, when the existing communications infrastructure is destroyed or disabled [6]. Mobile Ad hoc Networks are self-organized, temporal networks which consist of a set of wireless nodes. The nodes can move in an arbitrary manner and work as its own opinions. Nodes communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and maintaining connectivity in a decentralized manner. Each node in MANETs plays both the roles of routers and terminals. Such devices can communicate with another device that is immediately within their radio range or one that is outside their radio range not relying on access point [7]. A mobile ad hoc network is self-organizing, self-discipline and self-adaptive. The main characteristics of mobile ad hoc network are:

- Lack of Infrastructure: (Dynamic topology) since nodes in the network can move arbitrarily, the topology of the network also changes.
- Limitations on the Bandwidth: The bandwidth of the link is constrained and the capacity of the network is also variable tremendously [8]. Because of the dynamic topology, the output of each relay node will vary with the time and then the link capacity will change with the link change.
- Power considerations: it is a serious factor. Because of the mobility characteristic of the network, devices use battery as their power supply. As a result, the advanced power conservation techniques are very necessary in designing a system [5].
- Security Precautions: The security is limited in physical aspect. The mobile network is easier to be attacked than the fixed network. Overcoming the weakness in security and the new security trouble in wireless network is on demand [9].

A side effect of the flexibility is the ease with which a node can join or leave a MANET. Lack of any fixed physical and, sometimes, administrative infrastructure in these networks makes the task of securing these networks extremely challenging [10].

In MANETs it is very important to address the security issues related to the dynamically changing topology of the MANET [11], these issues may be defined as:

1- **Confidentiality.** The primary confidentiality threat in the context of MANET is to the privacy of the information being transmitted between nodes, which lead to a secondary privacy threat to information such as the network topology, geographical location, etc.

2- **Integrity.** The integrity of data over a network depends on all nodes in the network. Therefore threats to integrity are those which either introduce incorrect information or alter existing information.

3- **Availability.** This is defined as access information at all times upon demand. If a mobile node exists, then any node should be able to get information when they require it. Related to this, a node should be able to carry out normal operations without excessive interference caused by the routing protocol or security.

4- **Authorization.** An unauthorized node is one which is not allowed to have access to information, or is not authorized to participate in the ad hoc network. There is no assumption that there is an explicit and formal protocol, simply an abstract notion of authorization. However, formal identity authentication is a very important security requirement, needed to provide access control services within the ad hoc network.
5- **Dependability and reliability.** One of the most common applications for ad hoc networks is in emergency situations when the use of wired infrastructure is infeasible. Hence, MANET must be reliable, and emergency procedures may be required. For example, if a routing table becomes full due to memory constraints, a reactive protocol should still be able to find an emergency solution.

6- **Accountability.** This will be required so that any actions affecting security can be selectively logged and protected, allowing for appropriate reaction against attacks. The misbehaviours demonstrated by different types of nodes will need to be detected, if not prevented. Event logging will also help provide non-repudiation, preventing a node from repudiating involvement in a security violation [12, 13].

7- **Non-repudiation** Ensures that the origin of a message cannot deny having sent the message.

Neutrosophic sets can be viewed as a generalization of fuzzy sets that may better model imperfect information which is omnipresent in any conscious decision making.

### 1.2. The Contribution of Neutrosophic Sets

Neutrosophy has laid the foundation for a whole family of new mathematical theories generalizing both their classical and fuzzy counterparts [3, 4, 41] such as a neutrosophic set theory. We recollect some relevant basic preliminaries, and in particular, the work of Smarandache in [33, 34, 35] and Salama et al. [20-31]. Smarandache introduced the neutrosophic components T, I, F which represent the membership, indeterminacy, and non-membership values respectively, where \([0^+,1^+]\) is nonstandard unit interval. Salama et al. introduced the following: Let X be a non-empty fixed set. A neutrosophic set \(A\) is an object having the form \(A = \langle x, \mu_A(x), \sigma_A(x), \nu_A(x) \rangle\) where \(\mu_A(x), \sigma_A(x)\) and \(\nu_A(x)\) which represent the degree of membership function (namely \(\mu_A(x)\)), the degree of indeterminacy (namely \(\sigma_A(x)\)), and the degree of non-member ship (namely \(\nu_A(x)\)) respectively of each element \(x \in X\) to the set \(A\) where \(0^+ \leq \mu_A(x), \sigma_A(x), \nu_A(x) \leq 1^+\) and \(0^+ \leq \mu_A(x) + \sigma_A(x) + \nu_A(x) \leq 3^+\). Smarandache introduced the following: Let T, I,F be real standard or nonstandard subsets of \([0^+,1^+]\), with

- \(\text{Sup}_T = t_{\text{sup}}\), \(\text{inf}_T = t_{\text{inf}}\)
- \(\text{Sup}_I = i_{\text{sup}}\), \(\text{inf}_I = i_{\text{inf}}\)
- \(\text{Sup}_F = f_{\text{sup}}\), \(\text{inf}_F = f_{\text{inf}}\)
- \(n_{\text{sup}} = t_{\text{sup}} + i_{\text{sup}} + f_{\text{sup}}\)
- \(n_{\text{inf}} = t_{\text{inf}} + i_{\text{inf}} + f_{\text{inf}}\)

T, I, F are called neutrosophic components.

### 1.4 Public Key Security

The distinctive technique used in public key cryptography is the use of asymmetric key algorithms, where the key used to encrypt a message, not the same as the key used to decrypt it. Each user has a pair of cryptographic keys - a public encryption key and a private decryption key [14]. The provision of public key cryptography is widely distributed, while the private-decryption key is known only to the recipient. Messages are encrypted with the recipient's public key and can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. The keys are mathematically related,
but the parameters are chosen so that the determination of the private key of the public key is prohibitively expensive. The discovery of algorithms that can produce pairs of public / private key revolutionized the practice of cryptography in principle in mid-1970. In contrast, symmetric key algorithms, variations of which have been used for thousands of years, uses a single secret key - that should be shared and kept private by the sender and receiver - for encryption and decryption. To use a symmetric encryption scheme, the sender and receiver must share the key securely in advance. Because symmetric key algorithms are almost always much less computationally intensive, it is common to exchange a key using a key exchange algorithm and transmit data using that key and symmetric key algorithm [15]. Family PGP and SSL / TLS schemes do this, for example, and therefore speak of hybrid crypto system.

- The two main branches of public key cryptography are:
  - Public Key Encryption: a message encrypted with the recipient's public key can be decrypted by anyone except a holder of the corresponding private key - presumably this will be the owner of that key and the person associated with the public key used. This is used for confidentiality [16].
  - Digital signatures (Authentication): a signed message with the sender's private key can be verified by anyone with access to the sender's public key, which shows that the sender had access to the private key (and therefore likely to be the person associated with the public key used), and part of the message has not been tampered with. On the question of authenticity, see also the summary of the message [17].

The main idea behind public-key (or asymmetric) cryptosystems is the following:

One entity has (in contrast to symmetric cryptosystems) a pair of keys which are called the private key and the public key. These two parts of the key pair are always related in some mathematical sense. As for using them, the owner of such a key pair may publish her public key, but it is crucial that she keeps the private key only for herself. Let (sk, pk) be such a key pair where sk is the Secret private Key for node (A) and pk is the corresponding public key [18]. If a second node wants to securely send a message to (A) it computes:

\[ C = \text{encrypt}(M, pk) \]

where encrypt denotes the so-called encryption function which is also publicly known as shown in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Asymmetric Key encryption / decryption](image)

This function is a one-way function with a trap-door. In other words, the trap-door allows for the creation of the secret key sk which in turn enables Alice to easily invert the encryption function. We call C the cipher text. Obtaining M from C can be done easily using the (publicly known) decryption function decrypt and A’s private key (sk). On the other hand, it is much harder to decrypt without having any knowledge of the private key. As already mentioned, the great advantage of this approach is that no secure key exchange is necessary before a message is transmitted [19].

2. The proposed model for security

In this section, a Security algorithm applied to MANETs is presented. This algorithm may be viewed as a two stages: first a neutrosophic model to decide the key length for the current
session. Then the key distribution between nodes in MANET both stages are illustrated in the rest of this section.

2.1 Neutrosophic Model (Key Size Determination Function)

The security offered by the algorithm is based on the difficulty of discovering the secret key through a brute force attack. Mobile Status (MS) Security Level is the correlative factor being analyzed with three considerations:

1- The longer the password, harder to withstand a severe attack of brute force. In this research the key lengths from 16 to 512 are assumed

2- The quickest way to change passwords, more secure the mobile host. It is more difficult to decipher the key to a shorter time. A mobile host to change the secret key is often safer than a mobile host using a constant secret key.

The neighbor hosts the mobile host has, the more potential attacker. I.e. the possibility of attack is greater. There are many other factors affecting the safety of mobile hosts, such as bandwidth. The security level of mobile hosts is a function with multiple variables and affected more than one condition. Here a neutrosophic logic system is defined. Inputs of the neutrosophic logic system are the frequency of changing keys \( f \) and the number of neighbor hosts \( n \). Output of the neutrosophic logic system is the Security Level of MS. It is assumed that the three factors are independent with each other. The relationship of them is as follows:

\[
S \propto l.f \cdot \frac{1}{n} \quad \text{Formula 1}
\]

It means that the Security-Level of MH is in direct proportion to the length of the key and the frequency of changing keys, in inverse proportion to the number of neighbor hosts. The \( S \) value is updated by the neutrosophic logic system. When the key length is short, the Security-Level of MH should be low; otherwise the Security-Level of MS should be high.

- The first input parameter to the neutrosophic variable “the number of neighbor hosts” has three neutrosophic sets—few, normal and many. Membership function, non-membership and indeterminacy of \( n \) is illustrated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. Membership function, non-membership and indeterminacy of neutrosophic set with variable \( n \).](attachment:image.png)
The input neutrosophic variable “the frequency of changing keys” has two neutrosophic sets—slow and fast and non them. The membership functions, non-membership and indeterminacy of \( f \) is showed in formulation (2)

\[
f = \begin{cases} 
\text{slow} & \text{the secretKey is constant} \\
\text{fast} & \text{the secretKey is variable} \\
\text{Indeterminacy} & \text{non(slow,fast)}
\end{cases}
\]

The output neutrosophic variable “the Security-Level of MS” has five neutrosophic sets containing the set and its complementary set. These sets are (lowest, low, normal, high and highest). It should be noted that modifying the membership functions, non-membership and indeterminacy will change the sensitivity of the neutrosophic logic system’s output to its inputs. Also increasing the number of neutrosophic sets of the variables will provide better sensitivity control but also increases computational complexity of the system. Table 1 show the rules used in the neutrosophic system.

### Table 1: The neutrosophic system rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The output of that system determines the number of bits used and the security level required for the current situation varying the number of bits between 16 and 256 bits. This determination is based on the NS analysis which passes the three parameters of \( A = \{x, \mu_A(x), \sigma_A(x), \nu_A(x)\} \) where \( \mu_A(x), \sigma_A(x) \) and \( \nu_A(x) \) which represent the degree of membership function (namely \( \mu_A(x) \)), the degree of indeterminacy (namely \( \sigma_A(x) \)), and the degree of non-membership (namely \( \nu_A(x) \)) respectively of each element \( x \in X \) to the set \( A \) where \( 0^- \leq \mu_A(x), \sigma_A(x), \nu_A(x) \leq 1^+ \) and \( 0^- \leq \mu_A(x) + \sigma_A(x) + \nu_A(x) \leq 3^+ \), then based on that analysis the system decides the accurate key size in each situation.

### 2.2 key distribution

Once the neutrosophic set has decided the length of the session key based on its criteria the problem of key creation and distribution arises. The nature of NANET poses great challenges due to the lack of infrastructure and control over the network. To overcome such problems the use of PK scheme is used to distribute the key under the assumption that one node (let us
say the first node that originates the network) is responsible for the creation of session keys. If that node is going to leave the network it must transfer the process of key creation to another trusted node in the network.

1- Each node sends a message (Session Key Request SKR) encrypted with its private key (that message contains a key request and a timer) to the key creator node which owns a table that contains the public key for each node in the network. Figure 3 (a) where the direction of the arrow’s head denotes the private key used encryption is the originating node.

2- The key creator node simply decrypts the message and retrieves the request and the timer with one of the following scenarios occurs:
   a. The timer was expired or the message is unreadable the message is neglected.
   b. The timer is valid and the decryption of the message using the corresponding Public Key gives a readable request. The key creator node sends a message to that node containing the current session key. That message is encrypted two times first using the key creator’s Private key (for authentication) then using the destination’s public key Figure 3 (b). Where the direction of the arrow’s head denotes the private key used encryption is the trusted node then with the destination node’s Public Key.

3- Any time the neutrosophic model reports that the network condition changes; the key creator node sends a jamming message for every node currently in the network asking them to send a key request message.

4- Any authenticated node (including the Trusted node) on the network knowing the current session key can send messages either to every node or to a single node on the network, simply by encrypting the message using the current session key.

3. Experimental Results

In this research a new security algorithm for MANETs is presented, this algorithm is based on the idea of periodically changing the encryption key thus make it harder for any attacker to track that changing key. The algorithm is divided into three stages key size determination function and key distribution. In this section the set of experimental results for the attempts to decide the way for creating a more secured MANETs. These experiments are clarified.

3.1 Neutrosophic vs. Key size determination membership, non-membership functions and indeterminacy

The first type of experiments had taken place to decide the key size for the encryption process. To accomplish this job the ordinary mechanism of KNN is used as a neutrosophic technique. Given the same parameters passed to the membership function, non-membership function and indeterminacy. The performance is measured with evaluation criteria are the average security-
level and the key creation time. The performance criteria are demonstrated in the following sections:

3.1.1 The Percentage Average security-level:
Average security level is measured for both techniques as the corresponding key provided how much strength given the number of nodes, the results are scaled from 0 to 5 these results are shown in table 2 and figure 4.

**Table 2**: ASL of membership vs., non-membership and indeterminacy classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. nodes</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>125</th>
<th>150</th>
<th>175</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>225</th>
<th>250</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Average of Classification</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Average of non Classification</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indeterminacy</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4 and table 2 shows the average percentage security level with the number of mobile nodes between 25 and 250. As shown in the figure and the table, the average security-level of the neutrosophic Classifier (NC) is much higher than the average security-level of the membership, non-membership and indeterminacy classifier, especially for many mobile nodes. This is an expected result since the neutrosophic classifier adapts its self upon the whole set of criteria.

3.1.2 The key creation time:
The time required to generate the key in both cases are measured, the results are scaled from 0 to 1 and are shown in table 3 and figure 5.

**Table 3**: KCR of membership, non-membership and indeterminacy (neutrosophic classifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. nodes</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>125</th>
<th>150</th>
<th>175</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>225</th>
<th>250</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-membership Classification</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership Classification</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5 and table 3 shows the Key creation time with the number of mobile nodes between 25 and 250. The speed of Key creation is very high (mostly above 0.94) for all two techniques. However, the neutrosophic technique has some faster Key creation time, especially with few mobile nodes. The reason is that the smaller the number of nodes with the same amount of calculation the bigger the time taken.

3.2 PKI vs. non-PKI and indeterminacy distribution

After the Key size had been determined via the Key size determination function the final problem is to distribute that key among nodes on the network. There were two approaches for the key distribution problem either PKI or non-PKI. In this subsection the results of applying PKI and non-PKI and indeterminacy (neutrosophic) techniques are illustrated as applied in terms of security and processing time.

3.2.1 Neutrosophic Security

The PKI presents more overall security than ordinary non-PKI (single key) that is illustrated by applying both techniques over the network and recording the results regarding to the time required for an external attacker to break the session key. Table 4 and figure 6 shows that results under the assumption of using small public-private key pairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. nodes</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>125</th>
<th>150</th>
<th>175</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>225</th>
<th>250</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-PKI</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indeterminacy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Table 4: security of PKI vs. non-PKI and indeterminacy
In graph and figure shows the huge difference in the security level provided by the PKI technique over the Non-PKI mechanism given the same experimental conditions.

3.2.2 Processing time of neutrosophic data

Another factor had been taken into consideration while developing the model that is time required to process the key and distribute it. Table 5 and figure 7 shows that results under the assumption of using small public-private key pairs.

![Figure 6: Neutrosophic Security Data of PKI](image)

![Figure 7: Processing Time of Neutrosophic Data PKI](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. nodes</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>125</th>
<th>150</th>
<th>175</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>225</th>
<th>250</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-PKI</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indeterminacy</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 and the Figure 7 shows that Non-PKI techniques provides relatively small amount of
processing time than PKI and indeterminacy this due to the amount of modular arithmetic performed in the PKI mechanisms. However the difference in the processing time is neglectable comparing to the security level provided by the PKI under the same conditions.

4 Conclusions
MANETs require a reliable, efficient, and scalable and most importantly, a secure protocol as they are highly insecure, self-organizing, rapidly deployed and they use dynamic routing. In this paper, we discussed the vulnerable nature of the mobile ad hoc network. Also the security attributes and the various challenges to the security of MANET had been covered. The new security mechanism which combines the advantages of both neutrosophic classification and the public key infrastructure had been demonstrated. The advantages of the proposed mechanism comparing to other existing mechanisms had been shown by first comparing the neutrosophic to the non-classification showing that neutrosophic is more adaptable and provides a better response in MANET. Also the PKI is compared to the non-PKI and indeterminacy showing that it provides a far better security with a neglect table amount of delay.

References


[16.] Dabrowski J. and Kubale M., Computer Experiments with a Parallel Clonal Selection Algorithm for the Graph Coloring Problem. IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing (IPDPS 2008), 14-18 April, Miami, FL, USA, pp.1-6.


[35.] A. A. Salama and Smarandache, Neutrosophic Crisp Set Theory, 2015 USA Book, Educational. Education Publishing 1313 Chesapeake, Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43212.


[41.] L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, Inform and Control 8, 338-353.1965